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In June 2010, journalists for the Associated Press reported the arrest of
ten Russian spies, all suspected of being "deep-cover" illegal agents in the
United States.2 Seeking to convey the magnitude of this event, the
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1. "There is much in little." This five-kopeck Soviet postage stamp bears Abel's
image under the heading, "Soviet intelligence officer." The stamp is available at
http://en.wikipedia. org/wikilFile:1990_CPA_6265.jpg.
2. Pete Yost & Tom Hays, 10 Alleged Russian Secret Agents Arrested in U.S.,
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journalists wrote that this "blockbuster series of arrests" might even be as
significant as the FBI's "famous capture of Soviet Col. Rudolf Abel in 1957
in New York."' The reference may have been lost on many Americans, but
Colonel Abel's story of American justice at a time of acute anxiety about
the nation's security is one that continues to resonate today. The honor, and
error, that are contained in Colonel Abel's story offer lessons worth
remembering as the United States struggles against a new enemy:
international terrorists. One important lesson is that ad hoc departures from
the requirements of constitutional criminal procedure, even in the pursuit of
seemingly exigent and unique national security threats, tend to cause more
trouble than they are worth. Another is that these lessons have been
repeatedly learned and, it would seem, repeatedly forgotten. We should be
in the process of relearning these lessons today. In that spirit, after briefly
summarizing Colonel Abel's case and some of the themes it shares with
contemporary cases, this article presents selected aspects of Colonel Abel's
arrest, trial, and appeal.
Early in the morning of June 21, 1957, almost exactly fifty-three years
before the June 2010 arrests, Special Agents Edward Gamber and Paul
Blasco of the FBI pushed their way into Room 839 at the Hotel Latham in
Manhattan.4 The FBI agents sat a sleepy and half-naked Abel on his bed,
identified themselves as charged with investigating matters of internal
security, and questioned him for twenty minutes, insinuating knowledge of
his espionage activities by addressing him as "Colonel."5  The FBI agents
told Abel that "if he did not 'cooperate,' he would be arrested before he left
the room."6  When Abel refused, the FBI signaled to agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the INS, then under the authority
of the Department of Justice), who were waiting outside. Under the close
observation of the FBI agents, the INS agents arrested Abel, searched him
and the contents of his room, and seized several items as evidence of Abel's
alienage.' Immediately after Abel had "checked out" of the hotel with an
INS escort, the FBI agents obtained permission from the hotel manager to
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2010.
3. Id.
4. "Pushed" is the verb Special Agent Blasco chose to describe their entry. Direct
Examination of FBI Special Agent Paul J. Blasco. Transcript of Record at 175, Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), No. 2 [hereinafter Transcript]. The Transcript of Record may be
accessed digitally through the "U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 1832-1978" series
available through the Gale Database, http://find.galegroup.coml.
5. Id. at 179-183. Abel was also directly informed that the FBI had "received
information concerning [his] involvement in espionage." Id. at 184.
6. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 492 (2d Cir. 1958); Mildred Murphy, F.B.I.
Sifts Abel's Possessions for Possible Clues to Espionage; Cryptic Notes, Films, Scribbled
Names and Commonplace Objects Found in Suspect's Rooms Studied Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1957, at 8.
7. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1960). Abel did not consent to any
search, nor was his consent sought. Id. at 223.
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search Room 839 themselves. There they found a cipher pad, a hollowed-
out pencil, and microfilm, all of which became evidence used to convict
him at his criminal trial.'
Neither the FBI nor the INS sought a warrant signed by a federal judge
or a U.S. Commissioner to arrest Abel or to search his room.9 The
immigration agents possessed only an administrative order signed by
another Justice Department official, the INS District Director in New York,
granting them authority to detain Abel on a suspected immigration
violation."o The initial decision to bypass the standard warrant procedure
was perhaps driven by difficulties of surveillance, although Abel's
whereabouts were known long enough before his arrest to have obtained a
judicially authorized arrest warrant." "We were well aware of what he was
when we picked him up," the Commissioner of Immigration, Lt. Gen.
Joseph M. Swing, told reporters. "Our idea at the time was to hold him as
long as we could. . . . [W]e were holding him in the hope that sufficient
evidence could be gathered to indict him."I 2 The Commissioner said that
8. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 225. Abel tossed these three items into a
wastebasket prior to leaving his hotel room under arrest. The cipher pad was hidden in a
piece of wood wrapped with sandpaper. The microfilm was hidden in the pencil. Brief for
the United States at 23, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), No.2, 1959 WL 101553.
9. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d at 490. At the time, a United States Commissioner
performed several roles now tasked to a United States Magistrate Judge, including issuing
search and arrest warrants. See Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the
United States Commissioner System, 14 AMER. J. L. HISTORY 1, 2 (Jan. 1970).
10. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d at 491. Section 242(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), granted the INS this administrative arrest power.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 232.
11. According to Anthony R. Palermo, a key member of the prosecution team, Abel was
initially observed by FBI agents as early as mid-May, more than a month before his arrest. But
the agents staking out his Brooklyn studio lost track of him, and did not observe him again until
the night of Wednesday-Thursday, June 19-20th, when he was followed to the Hotel Latham.
Interviews with Anthony R. Palermo, August 2 and September 17, 2010. In an affidavit
submitted for Abel's criminal trial, Department of Justice Special Attorney Kevin T. Maroney
averred that no arrest warrant was sought because the Government believed (due to the
unwillingness of the Government's key witness, a Soviet defector, to testify) that it had
insufficient evidence available to secure either an arrest warrant or an indictment at that time.
Affidavit of Kevin T. Maroney, Transcript, supra note 4, at 57. Mr. Palermo drafted Maroney's
affidavit based on his personal interviews with FBI and INS agents. It should be noted that the
reluctance of this witness to testify at trial would not seem to have been an insurmountable
impediment to obtaining a warrant to search Abel's studio (although alerting Abel's Soviet bosses
that his cover was blown, as would his criminal arrest) and a superseding indictment could
certainly have been obtained following a lawful arrest and search.
12. Richard C. Wald, Spy Hunters Had Eye on Abel a Year, N.Y. HER. TRIB., Aug. 12,
1957, at 1 (as reproduced in Transcript, supra note 4, at 75-78). As discussed further below,
Commissioner Swing's reference to indictment appears to have been a post hoc
rationalization of the FBI's failure to turn Abel into a double agent. This ambition was not
fantastical, notwithstanding Abel's stoic refusal to cooperate; a senior Soviet intelligence
officer, Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov, fled to the United States in 1938 and published The
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his officers would not have arrested Abel had the FBI not requested that
they do so." In other words, the immigration law was used as a pretext for
the INS to arrest the man that the FBI wanted to detain itself, but thought it
could not.
But there seems to be more to this story, for it may not have been mere
doubt about the power to detain Abel that led to this tandem operation. As
already noted, reasonable minds might differ about whether the FBI had
probable cause to arrest Abel and search his rooms.14
Another explanation for the FBI's warrantless arrest might have been
the FBI's desire to keep Abel's detention absolutely secret; a warrant would
have required an arraignment, the opportunity for legal counsel, and the
potential for press coverage. What transpired after Abel's detention
suggests that avoiding the publicity that a standard arrest and arraignment
would generate may well have influenced the FBI's modus operandi. At
the Hotel Latham, the INS gave Abel a written order to appear at INS
offices in Manhattan to show cause why he should not be deported."
Perhaps because he was "the most professional spy we have yet
encountered" (as his prosecutor later informed a rapt press corps), Abel
remained there for only a few hours. 6  Instead, later that day, he was
secretly bustled onto a special plane waiting for him in Newark and flown
thirteen hours to a federal detention center in McAllen, Texas." He was
held there for almost seven weeks. During this time the FBI (not the INS)
questioned him in lengthy interrogation sessions and without a lawyer. The
FBI hoped to turn him into a double agent or at least obtain intelligence
about Soviet espionage.
Secret History of Stalin's Crimes (1952). The defection of Abel's subordinate, which led to
Abel's arrest, may have further encouraged hope to capitalize on Abel's own opportunism.
The FBI misjudged its quarry.
13. Wald, supra note 12.
14. See supra note 11. During Abel's detention in Texas, discussed infra, one of the
FBI agents involved in his arrest submitted an affidavit to a federal judge in support of a
warrant to search Abel's Brooklyn studio. The affidavit stated that Abel had been "taken
into custody" by INS officials and that "subsequent to his arrest" Abel had revealed his
identity and citizenship to INS officials. The affidavit made no mention of the involvement
of the FBI in either Abel's arrest, interrogation, or continuing detention in Texas, where this
information was obtained. Affidavit of Agent Joseph F. Phelan, Transcript, supra note 4, at
48-49.
15. Order To Show Cause and Notice of Hearing, reproduced in Transcript, supra note
4, at 34-37. The order compelled Abel to appear at 70 Columbus Avenue in Manhattan on
July 1, 1957, and informed him that he had the right to appear with counsel, to present
evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine government witnesses. Id. at 35-36.
16. The Rise and Ruin of a Successful Spy, LIFE MAG., Aug. 19, 1957, at 22. The
quotation is from Assistant U.S. Attorney William F. Tompkins.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1958), No.2, 1958
WL 91804. Frank Gibney, Intimate Portrait of a Russian Master Spy, LIFE MAG., Nov. 11,
1957, at 126.
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But Colonel Abel met threats and blandishments alike with stony
silence.'" The FBI finally gave up. He was quickly processed through
deportation proceedings (for which he was permitted a lawyer), found
deportable, but not deported." Instead, after three more weeks of
interrogation without the benefit of any counsel, Abel was returned to New
York to face capital charges of military and atomic espionage. 20 Only with
the announcement of his indictment on August 7th, did his forced
disappearance come to an end.2'
Abel had been held by federal agents in solitary confinement and total
secrecy for forty-eight days, two thousand miles from the place of his initial
arrest, without meaningful access to counsel, and without having appeared
before any judicial officer for any reason.22 The Justice Department had
18. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 7. Today, his silence might not be considered
sufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to have an attorney present during a custodial
interrogation. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2253-2254 (2010), the Supreme Court
held that the right must be invoked "unambiguously." The Court held that Thompkins had not
invoked his right by sitting "largely silent" through two hours and forty-five minutes of interrogation
before giving an inculpatory response and that he had knowingly and freely waived this right when
this silence was finally overcome and he chose to respond to his interrogators' questions.
19. Exactly when Abel was permitted to consult with a lawyer is disputed. The
affidavit of Abel's attorney at his criminal trial, James B. Donovan, whose integrity and
professionalism were praised throughout and after the trial, states that "[a]lthough he
promptly requested counsel in McAllen, his request was denied and he was held
incommunicado for five days, with daily questioning." Affidavit of James B. Donovan,
Transcript, supra note 4, at 24. Abel himself said that his request for counsel was denied on
the morning of his arrival in McAllen and he was questioned from nine in the morning until
midafternoon that day (a Saturday), followed by six hours of questioning on Sunday and
again on Monday by two teams of FBI agents working "in relays." On Tuesday, Abel
averred that he gave his name (an alias) and was then allowed counsel for purposes of his
deportation hearing, which was held that Thursday. Abel states that after he was found
deportable he was then questioned daily by FBI agents for the next three weeks. He does not
state whether his lawyer was present at these sessions, though that is doubtful given that his
limited role in Abel's deportation proceedings had concluded. Abel stated that he was
"served ... with a criminal warrant for [his] arrest" during his sixth week of secret
detention. Affidavit of Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Transcript, supra note 4, at 30-31, 33. The
affidavit of Kevin T. Maroney, a special attorney from the Justice Department's Internal
Security Division, stated that Abel did not request an attorney for the first four days of his
detention and disputed Abel's characterization of the intensity of his initial interrogation.
Affidavit of Kevin T. Maroney, Transcript, supra note 4, at 60-61. It should be noted,
however, that Maroney did not dispute (or even reference) Abel's claim to have been
questioned by the FBI daily for three weeks after his deportation hearing was held and prior
to both the issuance of a judicial warrant for his arrest and his indictment.
20. Russell Porter, Spy Suspect Fights Use of Seized Tools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1957, at 1.
21. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 8. Espionage: Artist in Brooklyn, TIME
MAG., Aug. 19, 1957.
22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 7-8.
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used the immigration laws as a pretext to accomplish this secret arrest,
which was otherwise impossible in our system of criminal justice.
The resonance between Abel's treatment and the seizure and
extraordinary detention of suspected terrorists in the years after September
11, 2001, is striking. For example, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was detained
on a judicially authorized material witness warrant for thirty-three days in
2002. Ostensibly, the arrest was to secure his testimony for the ongoing
grand jury investigation into the September 11th attacks, but in reality the
arrest was preventive detention on suspicion that he was plotting a major
terrorist attack himself. On the eve of a hearing about Padilla's legal status
(at which he would have been represented by counsel), the warrant was
vacated at the government's request.2 4 Padilla was transferred to military
custody, where he was held as an enemy combatant for almost four years
with no substantial contact with counsel. For the first six months, he was
held without any judicial decision regarding the lawfulness of his
detention.25 In March 2011, the Supreme Court heard the case of Abdullah
Al-Kidd, another American who alleges that the federal material witness
statute was used as a pretext to arrest, interrogate, and mistreat him on the
basis of terrorism suspicions that were insufficient to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's requirements for a lawful arrest.26 The Supreme Court (in an
opinion handed down just as this article was going to press) declined to
resolve the difficult issues presented by the allegations of pretext in the
27
case.
But even Padilla and Al-Kidd were not made to disappear in the way
that Abel did. The material witness statute used to justify their detention at
least required that a neutral magistrate authorize a warrant for their seizure
and that they be brought to a court for a public hearing shortly after being
23. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
24. Id. at 572.
25. Id. at 571; Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006). Donna Newman was Padilla's
assigned counsel. For a careful study of her efforts on behalf of her client both in and out of
the material witness statute framework, see Louis FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION AND 9/11:
RECURRING THREATS TO AMERICA'S FREEDOMS 197-209 (2008).
26. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 415. Oral
argument was held on March 2, 2011. The material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. §3144, authorizes a
judicial officer to issue a warrant for the arest of a witness if "it appears from an affidavit filed by
a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena." The statute also
contemplates judicial consideration of less intrusive means of securing the testimony of the
witness.
27. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. _(201 1). In a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Kennedy noted "the difficulty of these issues,"
and observed that the Court's holding left "unresolved whether the Government's use of the
Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, No. 10-98 (U.S. May
31, 2011), slip op. at 1-2 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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seized, a hearing at which they had the right to be represented by counsel.2 8
Abel was only provided counsel for the few hours consumed by his
deportation hearing; the rest of his summer was spent in lawyer-less, secret
detention and subject to frequent interrogation.29  Padilla's detention also
differed significantly from Abel's in that it was announced almost
immediately by the Attorney General, ironically enough, at a press
conference in Moscow.30
After 9/11, transparency has not always been the default. In the
immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy ordered the closure of "special interest" immigration
hearings that many subsequently suspected to have involved the same
pretextual conduct evidenced in Abel's case.3' In the words of Yogi Berra,
was this d6jh vu all over again?
Who was this Colonel Abel, whose case would be argued twice before
the United States Supreme Court? Who was his American lawyer, James
Donovan? Why did he take this case, how did he argue it, and what
resonance does the matter have for American criminal law and criminal
procedure? Ideologically driven, international terrorists are today's nearest
analogue to Communist agents in the atmosphere of hyper-fear that was still
so palpable in the shadow of the McCarthy era. What lessons can be
learned from the case of Colonel Abel as the United States struggles to
balance national security and justice in its pursuit of suspected terrorists?
28. 18 U.S.C. §3144. This statute incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. §3142(f): "The
hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial
officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance. Except
for good cause, a continuance on motion of such person may not exceed five days . . , and a
continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government may not exceed three days. At
the hearing, such person has the right to be represented by counsel, and, if financially unable
to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed."
29. See supra note 19.
30. U.S. Arrests Man Allegedly Planning Attack, NewsHour, June 10, 2002, available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/dirtybomb_06-10-02.html.
31. Memorandum from Michael Creppy to all immigration judges and court
supervisors, September 21, 2001, available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw. com/
hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. A circuit split resulted that the Supreme Court
declined to resolve. The Sixth Circuit held that the Creppy order violated the First
Amendment. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The Third
Circuit, on the other hand, sustained Judge Creppy's closure order by distinguishing
immigration hearings from other judicial hearings with a greater tradition of openness.
North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S.
1056 (2003). The justification offered by the FBI for closed deportation hearings was very
similar to the national security interest advanced in keeping Abel's arrest a secret: "insight
gleaned from open proceedings might alert vigilant terrorists to the United States'
investigative tactics and could easily betray what knowledge the government does-or does
not-possess." North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 200.
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As already noted, one lesson is that the reluctance to pursue Abel
through regular criminal justice processes was unnecessary and even
potentially damaging to the Government's national security interests. In the
end, it was the evasion of general rules - because of the certainty of
government officials that this case was an exceptional one - that required
the Government to defend its actions in two separate oral arguments before
the Supreme Court. Although the Court sustained the Government's
actions, it did so by a single vote in a weak judicial opinion that could
easily have gone the other way. Had the United States followed normal
procedure, Abel would still have been convicted, but without the need to
justify this exceptionalism and risk the loss of its biggest catch yet in the
Cold War.
The Abel case is a fecund study worthy of book-length treatment. In
this brief article, I will explore just three topics: the appointment of counsel;
the defense's investigation and cross-examination of witnesses for the
prosecution; and the defense motion to suppress the evidence obtained
through the tandem conduct of the FBI and the INS that midsummer's
morning. It was this motion that brought Abel's case to the attention of the
highest court in the land.
FBI MUG SHOT OF RUDOLF ABEL"
I. WHO WAS COLONEL ABEL?
But first, who was Colonel Abel? Even the most basic details of the
life of a master Soviet spy are shrouded in obscurity. Rudolf Ivanovich
32. Indeed, it has been the subject of such treatment in the United States, JAMES B.
DONOVAN, STRANGERS ON A BRIDGE: THE CASE OF COLONEL ABEL (1964) [hereinafter
DONOVAN], and in the United Kingdom, VIN ARTHEY, LIKE FATHER LIKE SON: A DYNASTY
OF SPIES (2004) [hereinafter ARTHEY]. With the exception of Donovan's own diary-driven
recollection of the case, no one has written a book focused on the legal issues presented by
the case.
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Abel was born in 1903 as William August Fisher in what was then the
outskirts of the city of Newcastle upon Tyne in northern England. 4 He was
the son of Heinrich Fischer, a well-educated metalworker born in Russia of
German ancestry who would later flee Tsarist Russia to found the
Newcastle branch of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party and
assist in the publication and distribution of the party organ, Iskra, while
Vladimir Lenin was quartered in London.3 ' As a teenager, Abel moved
from England to Moscow, where his father took a short turn on the
Comintern's UK desk before Lenin's death made the life of an old
Bolshevik a precarious one. Abel married and the couple was blessed with
a daughter.
Abel's British citizenship meant a legitimate Western European
passport, his Newcastle upbringing gave him native English fluency, and
his wife and child in Moscow were excellent insurance against defection;
this plus his worker's credentials and internationalist upbringing were (to
quote Humphrey Bogart quoting Shakespeare) the stuff that dreams are
made of - that is, if the dreamer recruited for the Soviet clandestine
services.3 ' After surviving the Stalinist purge and with a distinguished
record in World War II (no mean feat, either one), Abel became an "illegal"
KGB intelligence officer - i.e. one formally unassociated with the Soviet
Embassy or other official mission - active in Oslo and London before he
ran all Soviet espionage in North America for nine years.
34. ARTHEY, supra note 32. Because Abel is the name by which Fisher was known
during his trial, I use it here for consistency with most primary sources. His real identity was
unknown until 1972, when an American journalist found both "Abel" and "Fisher" carved in
his tombstone in Moscow's Donskoi Cemetery. JOHN COSTELLO & OLEG TSAREV, DEADLY
ILLUSIONS 372 (1993). It should be noted that some have questioned the integrity of this
book due to the active role of the Russian foreign intelligence service in selecting its author
and allowing him selective access to its records. CHRISTOPHER ANDREW & VASILI
MITROKHIN, THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE: THE KGB IN EUROPE AND THE WEST 26-27 (1999).
To his credit, Costello is clear about this collaboration but does so while effusively thanking
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB's last chairman and a plotter in the coup against Gorbachev.
COSTELLO & TSAREV, supra, at vii. The "real" Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was actually a very
close friend of Fisher and a fellow KGB officer. ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 114-116.
Unbeknownst to Fisher, Abel had died shortly after Fisher left Moscow for what would be
his last assignment. ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 226. The name had been used as the agreed
means to signal Moscow that Fisher had been arrested, but its use in this way after the death
of his friend apparently haunted Fisher. ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 226; ANDREW &
MITROKHIN, supra, at 225.
35. ARTHEY,supra note 32, at 3, 11, 21-23.
36. Id. at xxxi, 66-68.
37. Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon (1941); William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act
4, scene 1, lines 156-158.
38. DONOVAN, supra note 32; ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 87-116, 163. He was
apparently also active in France and Turkey. ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 124. Evidence at
his trial established links of various strengths to Morris and Lona Cohen, a.k.a. Peter and
Helen Kroger, arrested in Britain along with Gordon Lonsdale, and Helen Sobell, wife of
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That all came crashing down with his arrest in Manhattan, secret
interrogation in Texas, and trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, which sits in Brooklyn. The trial required ten days,
the prosecution called twenty-seven witnesses, and over one hundred
exhibits were admitted into evidence." The prosecution's case revolved
around the testimony of Reino Hayhanen, Abel's incompetent subordinate,
who had secretly defected to the United States. 40 Due to a surprising lapse
by a spy as accomplished as Abel, Hayhanen had learned the location of
Abel's workplace in Brooklyn.4 1 It was also probably due to Hayhanen's
own incompetence that a local newsboy acquired a hollowed-out nickel
containing an encrypted message to Hayhanen, physical evidence that
figured prominently at trial.42 It was Hayhanen's initial refusal to testify
against his former superior officer that led the FBI to enlist the assistance of
the INS in Abel's arrest.43 Abel was caught surrounded by the tools of his
trade, ample evidence to support espionage charges." Under the
imnuigration statutes at that time, no judicial approval was necessary for
federal executive agents to detain Abel and search his effects. 45 But it was
this pretextual use of administrative powers under the immigration laws - a
sham in fact intended to pressure Abel to become a double agent or, failing
that, to gather evidence for his criminal prosecution - that attracted the
interest of the Supreme Court, not Abel's notoriety.46
Morton Sobell, a co-defendant in the Rosenberg case. ROBERT J. LAMPHERE & TOM
SCHACTMAN, THE FBI-KGB WAR: A SPECIAL AGENT'S STORY 274-278 (1986). Subsequent
information suggests connections with American scientist Ted Hall, Soviet spy and defector
Alexander Orlov, and the Rosenbergs. ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra note 34, at 193-195;
JOSEPH ALBRIGHT & MARCIA KUNSTEL, BOMBSHELL: THE SECRET STORY OF AMERICA'S
UNKNOWN ATOMIC SPY CONSPIRACY, 196-97, 221-22, 244-253 (1997) (Cohens & Hall);
EDWARD VAN DER RHOER, THE SHADOW NETWORK: ESPIONAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
SOVIET POLICY 160-161 (1983) (Rosenbergs). Notwithstanding these links, others have
judged his career to have been a "pedestrian reality" that "achieved nothing of real
significance." ANDREW & MITROKHIN, supra note 34, at 229.
39. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 245-246.
40. Espionage: Pudgy Finger Points, TIME MAG., Oct. 28, 1957.
41. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 146; ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 208-210.
42. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 185-86; LAMPHERE & SCHACTMAN, supra note 38, at
274. The newsboy found the nickel in 1953 and gave it to the local police, who sent it to the
FBI. Robert Lamphere, the FBI specialist who examined the nickel and the cipher it
contained, wrote a memo that (unsuccessfully) urged an immediate redeployment of
manpower to search for an illegal Soviet intelligence officer in New York. LAMPHERE &
SCHACTMAN, supra note 38, at 270-272.
43. Brief for the United States at 6, Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217 (1958), No.2, 1958 WL
101553.
44. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 11.
46. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1960) ("Of course, the nature of the
case, the fact that it was a prosecution for espionage, has no bearing whatever upon the legal
considerations relevant to the admissibility of evidence.").
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The jury deliberated for three and a half hours before convicting Abel
on October 25, 1957, on all three counts of the indictment for conspiring to
obtain and transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union as an
unregistered foreign agent.4 7 The speed with which the jury returned its
verdict might suggest that its value as a protection of Abel's (or a suspected
terrorist's) rights is overstated. But as will be discussed below, the jury's
presence was important to Abel not only for the power it transferred from
the state to the people at large, but for the adversarial process and rules of
evidence that it imposed on the trial as a whole. Questions of process and
evidence - access to and rights of counsel, rules for the authentication and
admissibility of evidence, burdens of production, and standards of proof -
drive the current debate over the choice of civilian courts or military
commissions to prosecute suspected terrorists as much as substantive
questions about whether the criminal law or the law of armed conflict
should govern proceedings about terrorism offenses.
Abel was spared execution (conspiracy to transmit atomic secrets, count
one of the indictment, was a capital offense) largely because of his lawyer's
foresight and skill in articulating the national interest in preserving Abel's
life for an exchange of agents at some future date; instead, he was
sentenced to thirty years in prison. Abel would not complete his sentence.
On the cold morning of February 10, 1962, Abel was exchanged for
captured U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers on the Glienicke Bridge that
connected Potsdam with Soviet-controlled East Berlin.48 Abel's attorney,
James Donovan, would be the one to hand Abel over in that exchange but,
more importantly, it was he who negotiated the swap in the first place.
Thus, the appointment of James Donovan was more crucial than anyone
could have anticipated.
II. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
At Abel's side from his initial plea through his trial, conviction,
incarceration, and finally his exchange on a wintry German bridge stood
James Britt Donovan. Donovan, forty-one years old when he first met
Abel, was a Harvard-educated New York City lawyer, former Nuremburg
prosecutor, and general counsel to what was known as the O.S.S. during
World War II.49 This exceptional lawyer recorded his work in this case in a
book entitled Strangers on a Bridge, which is essentially a detailed lawyer's
47. Edith Evans Asbury, Abel Guilty as Soviet Spy; Could Get Death Sentence, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1957, at 1. Frank Gibney, Intimate Portrait of a Russian Master Spy, LIFE
MAG., Nov. 11, 1957, at 129.
48. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 3-4; ARTHEY, supra note 32, at xvi, passim.
49. Mildred Murphy, Abel, Spy Suspect, Accepts Donovan; Russian Has Long Talk
With Former O.S.S. Counsel Who Will Defend Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1957, at 3.
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diary supplemented with the transcripts and reporting of the trial and
appeal.o The CIA evidently considered the publication of Donovan's book,
two years after the prisoner exchange on the Glienicke Bridge, to be an
event of sufficient significance that a secret report was written about it and
added to Abel's file." Portions of this report remain redacted more than
twenty-nine years later.
Donovan's decision to accept Abel as a client was not one to be taken
lightly. First of all, the work would most likely be done pro bono, i.e.
without compensation. As it turns out, the trial judge approved a fee up to
$10,000 out of money seized from Abel following his arrest, but Donovan
indicated that he would donate it all to charity (a politic move)." Second,
the case would likely take a considerable amount of time. As it turns out,
the obligation lasted almost four-and-a-half years.54 Lastly, the notoriety of
such an unpopular client in McCarthy-era America could destroy a lawyer's
reputation and sink his legal practice. Donovan returned home from his
first meeting with his client to find on his desk a drawing made by his eight-
year-old daughter depicting "a black-haired, slant-eyed convict in stripes
with a ball and chain," with the caption, in a child's hand, "Russian Spy in
Jail: Jim Donovan is working for him."
Why, then, did Donovan accept the appointment? He was not a
government agent assigned to Abel to ensure his conviction (although
Donovan made it clear to Abel that he distinguished sharply between "my
duty to him as defense attorney and my duty as an American citizen."). 6
Although it might seem almost offensive to an American lawyer's ears to
suggest the idea of a government stooge for a lawyer, this important fact is
worth noting. James Donovan was in private practice, a distinguished
member of the New York Bar. Donovan had been nominated by a
committee of lawyers from the Brooklyn Bar Association after Abel
requested the judge to assign counsel with the advice of the Bar." Perhaps
50. DONOVAN, supra note 32.
51. STRANGERS ON THE BRIDGE [SIC] (JUNE 17, 1965), A FIVE-PAGE REPORT, available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse docs_full.asp.
52. Id.
53. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 14. See also Dr. James B. Donovan, 53, Dies;
Lawyer Arranged Spy Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1970, at 43.
54. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 3, 16. Abel agreed to Donovan's appointment on
August 21, 1957. The prisoner exchange on the Glienicke Bridge occurred on February 10,
1962. The interim period amounts to 1634 days.
55. See id. at 15.
56. See id. at 31.
57. Assignment of James B. Donovan as Counsel, United States of America v.
Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, Order of United States District Judge Matthew T. Abruzzo,
Transcript, supra note 4, at 20. According to Anthony Palermo, who was sent from the
Justice Department's Internal Security Division to be a special attorney in this case, Abel's
request for Judge Abruzzo to appoint counsel recommended by the Bar Association (rather
than merely appointed at the judge's individual discretion) was rather unusual. Telephone
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partly due to his own wartime work as counsel for the OSS, Donovan was
convinced of his client's guilt.58 But Donovan accepted the appointment,
and zealously represented Abel's interests until the day they parted on the
middle of the Glienicke Bridge.
Donovan was following in the honorable tradition of American lawyers
who, once appointed, zealously defend the interests of their clients no
matter how infamous or unpopular, often for little or no compensation.
Three judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ended
their opinion affirming Abel's conviction by thanking Donovan and his
assistants, who "represented the appellant with rare ability and in the
highest tradition of their profession. We are truly grateful to them for the
services which they have rendered." 9 I am proud to note that among those
leaders of the bar who wrote to congratulate Donovan on his appointment
and offer encouragement was Col. Robert Storey, a fellow Nuremberg
prosecutor and former ABA president, who was then serving as Dean of the
Law School at Southern Methodist University.'
This honorable tradition preceded the adoption of our Constitution -
recall the defense by John Adams of British soldiers on trial for the Boston
Massacre. And this tradition has been embraced even (perhaps especially)
in times of war. One need only think of then Colonel Kenneth C. Royall,
who, in defiance of an order by President Roosevelt, sought judicial review
for Nazi saboteurs whom he was assigned to represent before a military
commission. More recently, one recalls Lieutenant Commander Charles
Swift's defense of Salim Hramdan, a detainee at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.
Both lawyers, like Donovan, defended the constitutional rights of their
Interview with Anthony Palermo, August 2, 2010. Perhaps for this reason, Judge Abruzzo
was rather irked by the request, although he complied with it. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at
393.
58. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 18 ("There was no question in my mind that Abel was
exactly what the government claimed, and that he had decided it would be futile to argue
otherwise.").
59. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 502 (1958). According to Donovan, Chief
Justice Earl Warren also congratulated him on behalf of the entire Supreme Court following
oral argument. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 308.
60. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 27. Other famous names surround the Abel case. On
the defense team was Thomas M. Debevoise, of the well-established New York legal family
and future Dean of Vermont Law School. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 56; Dennis Hevesi,
Eli Whitney Debevoise Dies at 90; Co-Founder of a Top Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1990; Law School Dedicates $6.5 Million Renovation to Tom Debevoise, THE HERALD OF
RANDOLPH, May 26, 2005, http://www.rherald.com/news/2005-05-26/Front page/f07.html.
For the prosecution, there was Cornelius W. Wickersham, Jr., DONOVAN, supra note 32, at
68.
61. Louis FISHER, NAzI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN
LAw 43-45, 55-59 (2005).
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infamous clients, and thus the interests of justice, right up to the Supreme
Court.'
Although the right to the assistance of counsel is constitutionally
protected, and members of the bar are encouraged to offer pro bono
service of the sort Donovan committed to provide, no lawyer is required to
do so, or do so for any particular client. The fact that such clients are thus
avoidable, combined with the pressures faced by lawyers who accept such
assignments, makes the individual courage they must possess all the more
admirable. Sadly, every crisis seems to require a relearning of old truths.
Perhaps it was inevitable that a senior official at the United States
Department of Defense, ignorant of or uninterested in the lessons of the
past, crudely attacked the lawyers working pro bono to represent detainees
at Guantdnamo Bay." He was rightly excoriated by the private bar as well
as members of the Bush Administration, who ultimately forced his apology
and resignation.
III. DEFENSE INVESTIGATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
A. Negotiating the Rules in Abel's Case
Appointed by the court and accepted by his client, Donovan
immediately started work. Donovan tried to persuade the U.S. Attorney to
adopt for Abel's case the European requirements of broad pretrial
disclosure that Donovan had followed as a young prosecutor at Nuremburg.
62. Royall's case was ultimately decided as the ignominious Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S.
I (1942). Swift's case became Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Roughly two
weeks after the Supreme Court decided the case, Swift was informed that he had been denied
a promotion and, under the Navy's "up-or-out" system, was therefore forced to resign his
commission. Carol Rosenberg, Guantdnamo Defense Lawyer Forced out of Navy, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmli/nationworld/
2003294468 lawyer08.html. It should be noted that there could also be a cost to
prosecutors. Colonel Morris Davis was chief prosecutor at Guantinamo Bay. He retired
after twenty-five years of service in the Air Force, citing Pentagon interference with his
prosecutorial discretion and his conclusion that the procedural rights of the accused were
insufficiently protected by rules governing the military commissions in which he was
ordered to participate. Josh White, Ex-Prosecutor Alleges Pentagon Played Politics, WASH.
POST, Oct. 20, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/10/20/AR2007102000179.html.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
64. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2007, at Al (reporting comments by Charles D. Stimson, the deputy assistant secretary
of defense for detainee affairs, "I think, quite honestly, when corporate C.E.O.'s see that
those firms are representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those
C.E.O.'s are going to make those law firms choose between representing terrorists or
representing reputable firms, and I think that is going to have major play in the next few
weeks. And we want to watch that play out.").
65. Official Quits After Remark on Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007.
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The U.S. Attorney refused to agree to anything more than the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure required of him, believing "that so general a pretrial
disclosure would be an unfortunate precedent for criminal prosecutions" in
the United States.6 Today, ironically, in the habeas corpus proceedings for
detainees at Guantinamo Bay, the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld has permitted more European-style inquisitorial principles to
replace the rules of evidence that traditionally define our adversarial
system. This comparison is explored below. But let us return first to
Donovan's case.
As it turns out, a small revolution in criminal procedure had occurred
just months before Donovan was appointed to defend Abel. In June 1957,
the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Jencks v. United States.7
Clinton Jencks, a union leader, had been convicted of lying to the National
Labor Relations Board about his membership in the Communist Party.
Jencks sought the production of numerous reports made by two paid FBI
informants who testified against him.69 Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, overturned the conviction obtained without permitting the defense to
inspect these reports, noting that "[e]very experienced trial judge and trial
lawyer knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the
witness recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory."o If
the state wished to invoke a privilege against production - say for national
security reasons - the price of that decision was "letting the defendant go
free [since] it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and
then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything
which might be material to his defense."7 1
These words are worth noting today, when fear of terrorists has
replaced fear of communists. The state feels the same pressure to imprison
(whether upon criminal conviction or as military detention) without fully
disclosing its grounds for doing so. Justice Brennan quoted Justice
66. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 26.
67. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Mildred Murphy, Abel, Spy Suspect,
Accepts Donovan; Russian Has Long Talk with Former O.S.S. Counsel Who Will Defend
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1957, at 3. Donovan, and the press, were aware of its
implications for the Abel case from the start. Mildred Murphy, Ex-Navy Officer To Defend
Abel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1957, at 10.
68. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 658-659. Section 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Taft-Hartley Act, required each officer of any labor organization seeking the benefits of the
Act to swear an affidavit that "he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any
organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods." Labor-Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec.101, §9(h), 61 Stat. 136, 146 (1947).
69. Jencks, 353 U.S. at 659.
70. Id. at 667.
71. Id. at 671.
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Sutherland's famous phrase that "the interest of the United States in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."n Nevertheless, it would be another six years before the Supreme
Court held that the defendant's right to due process of law also required the
prosecution to turn over other potentially exculpatory evidence in its
*73
possession.
Fifteen years would pass before justice was seen to require the state to
reveal material that could impeach the testimony or character of its own
witnesses at trial.74 Of course, the purpose of detaining a terrorist who
meets the criteria for designation as an enemy combatant under the law of
armed conflict (and therefore the procedures to be used to make such a
determination) is quite different than the objective of a criminal prosecution
of a defendant charged with a crime, even one of the many crimes of
terrorism. But when the Government's objectives are unclear, or lead to
confusion as to which body of law or which system of adjudication is
proper, the interests of the United States in both national security and
justice are ill-served. As noted below, recent cases concerning detainees in
the so-called war on terror demonstrate that these principles remain
contested in the context of deciding petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
The Jencks opinion led Congress to pass the Jencks Act, which entered
into force just two weeks before the date originally set for Abel's trial.7 1 It
was front page news when Donovan invoked the Act at the conclusion of
the direct examination of the prosecution's star witness, Abel's former
subordinate and now Soviet defector, Reino Hayhanen. Hayhanen had been
on the witness stand for two and a half days, producing 325 pages of
testimony; Donovan wanted to compare this story told in court with the
"basic raw material of what the man said" to the FBI before the trial
began. The court denied Donovan's motion to review notes describing
more than 75 FBI interviews on the grounds that the reports were
"interpretative," not "substantially verbatim," as required by the statute for
release to the defense. But even the modest release that the court did grant
Donovan proved the value of such information: one prior statement, written
and signed by Hayhanen, directly contradicted his testimony that he had
engaged in espionage at Abel's direction. Donovan could then ask the
72. Id. at 668 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
73. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
74. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
75. See Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. §3500.
76. Michael Clark, F.B.I. Files Asked by Abel's Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1957, at
1; DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 166-67.
77. Michael Clark, Abel Trial Lists G.I. As Soviet Spy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1957, at 1;
DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 166, 181.
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classic question of cross-examination: was Hayhanen lying then or lying
now? 8
The government's second witness was Master Sergeant Roy Rhodes,
whom prosecutors presented as a loyal family man blackmailed into
providing information to Soviet agents while posted to the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow. 79 The prosecution tied him to Abel through Hayhanen as someone
the duo sought to contact and pursue after Rhodes returned home to the
United States. The Government had agreed to Donovan's requests under
the Jencks Act for statements made by Rhodes in the course of his
debriefing by U.S. counterintelligence officers. The tapes of these sessions
revealed a very different picture of Rhodes, which validated Justice
Brennan's observations in the Jencks case but also presented a serious
problem for the defense. Rhodes, it turned out, was far from the hapless
dupe he had been made out to be. Rather, he appeared to have operated a
small business while in Moscow selling secrets for a considerable amount
of money, alcohol, and other forms of compensation. But in Donovan's
judgment, impeaching him with his own prior statements to federal agents
"could rock the American diplomatic representation in Moscow and other
foreign capitals," and reveal secret intelligence information damaging to
national security.
Providence could not have found a better case or counsel in which to
present this issue for decision:
[T]he prosecution had elected to put Rhodes on the stand. Now I
was expected to cross-examine him. The prosecution, I said, had
placed me in an outrageous predicament. As court-assigned
counsel I was bound to do everything I could for my client; but I
was also a United States citizen, still held a commission as a
commander in Naval Intelligence, and had worked for three years
in the OSS during World War H to help establish a permanent
central intelligence system in this country. The last thing I wanted
to see happen, I added, would be to have our intelligence apparatus
compelled to bring before the jury the contradictory statements of
Rhodes. I argued that for this reason, as well as the others I had
voiced the day before, the entire testimony of Rhodes should be
stricken from the court record."
78. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 179. Donovan asked this question with subtlety,
closing his cross-examination by slowly reading aloud from Hayhanen's statement, pointing
out to the jury that it was in the witness's own handwriting. Id.
79. Id.
80. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 197-198. Donovan's "outrageous predicament"
illustrates another tradition in Anglo-American law as honorable and as lasting as the one
concerning the appointment of counsel, supra text accompanying note 53. That is the
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What to do? According to Anthony Palermo, then a member of the
prosecution team specially appointed for this case from the Justice
Department's Internal Security Division in Washington, such was the
confidence that the lawyers for each side had in one another's integrity and
professionalism that a sort of "gentleman's understanding" emerged
between them about how to balance the lawyer's responsibility to his client
with what Donovan apparently considered his duty as an American citizen."'
Donovan, however, eked out only a statement from the judge to the jury
that Rhodes had made conflicting statements and, therefore, although the
matter could not be fully revealed because of national security, the fact of
that conflict should serve to discredit his testimony about his activities in
Moscow.82 "Such," concluded the judge, "is the purpose of cross-
examination." 83  This point was driven home by Donovan's subsequent
questioning of Rhodes, which ended with Donovan reminding the
dishonored sergeant, with evident disgust, that even Benedict Arnold had
not betrayed his country for money."
Today, questions about how to use sensitive national security
information are raised more frequently. The issue is now resolved in
criminal cases not by gentlemen's agreements but by a federal statute, the
Classified Information Procedures Act.8 ' This statute provides detailed
procedures for the use of classified information (or, more often, suitable
obligation of zealous defense of the interests of one's client. As Lord Brougham famously
characterized this responsibility in Queen Caroline's Case in 1820:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences,
though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2068 (2010).
81. Telephone Interview with Anthony Palermo, Aug. 2, 2010.
82. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 197-201.
83. See id. at 199.
84. See id. at 206. I asked Anthony Palermo whether this ruling was fair to Donovan,
since he could have engaged in a far more prolonged cross-examination of Rhodes, albeit at
the expense of revealing information potentially embarrassing or damaging to American
intelligence. Mr. Palermo, who has maintained a distinguished career in public service and
private practice after his role in the Abel case, felt that Donovan had done a "good job with a
bad hand" in the case. Prolonging Rhodes' time on the stand, he noted, risked antagonizing
the jury by appearing to brow beat a defeated man in uniform (even one who had disgraced
that uniform). Donovan "did not have to go to the bottom of the pit," to establish that
Rhodes was an unsavory character. Telephone Interview with Anthony Palermo, August 2,
2010. Any speculation as to whether Donovan was forced to pull his punches by his
perception of the conflict between his roles as counsel and citizen should be balanced with
these tactical considerations.
85. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III, §§1-16 (1980).
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substitutions or unclassified summaries of it) that balance the interests of
the defense in the presentation of its case with the interests of the
government in preventing the "graymail" that could lead the government to
abandon a prosecution in order to protect sensitive information.
In civil cases, the issue remains much more controversial. This is
because of the one-sided nature of the state secrets privilege, which is
available only to the Government. The privilege is based in case law, not
codified as its criminal docket counterpart is.86  The privilege may be
invoked not only as a basis for denying certain evidence sought by the
plaintiff in a civil matter but also to protect the Government from the
Hobson's choice of revealing secret information in order to mount a
successful defense.87 In the context of the so-called War on Terror, the state
secrets privilege has been invoked in cases alleging extraordinary rendition
and torture at the hands of U.S. officials or their foreign allies.8 ' Assertion
of the privilege typically results in dismissal of the entire case, even when
the plaintiffs well-pled allegations, if "true or essentially true, [would lead]
all fair-minded people" to agree that the plaintiff "has suffered injuries as a
result of our country's mistake and deserves a remedy."89
If Hayhanen and Rhodes were the star witnesses, the most sensational
piece of physical evidence was the mysterious hollow nickel mentioned
earlier. Hayhanen had given a similarly doctored Finnish coin to officials at
the U.S. Embassy in Paris in order to establish his bona fides as a defector.90
Counsel on both sides argued vigorously about the admission of these coins
into evidence. The Government claimed that the coins could be nothing but
a spy's container; the defense insisted that these were common novelty
items available in any magic store.9' Of course, the arguments of counsel
do not constitute evidence, as the judge reminded them. But this argument
played out in front of the jury because both counsel wanted to implant their
theories of the case in the minds of the jurors.
86. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); In re National Security Agency
Telecommunications Records Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114, 1118-1119, 1123
(2008).
87. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1.
88. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir., 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409
(2010); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947
(2007).
89. The quote is from Judge T.S. Ellis HI commenting on his dismissal of the civil
action of Khaled El-Masri, alleging his extraordinary rendition and torture. El-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 541 (E.D.Va. 2006). For a critical discussion of the state secrets
privilege, see Louis Fisher, The State Secrets Privilege: Relying on Reynolds, 122 POL. SCI.
QUARTERLY 385 (2007).
90. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 159.
91. Idat 161-162.
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THE "HOLLOW NICKEL" OPENED UP 92
-I, L,




ENCRYPTED MESSAGE HIDDEN WITHIN THE HOLLOW NICKEL
B. The Jury
Likewise, the presence of a jury meant that the direct testimony of
Hayhanen and Rhodes was pockmarked with Donovan's voiced objections:
to the leading form of questions asked by the prosecution, the relevance of
the issues raised in the direct examination, and the competence of the
witness to answer them. These objections, like the rulings on them from the
bench, illustrate the great trust placed in juries by the American system. As
92. These images of the "hollow nickel" and the encrypted message found inside it,
submitted as evidence against Abel, are available at http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/fam
cases/abel/abel.htm.
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often as not, Judge Byers answered each objection by noting that "[i]t is for
the jury to say whether or not they consider it of any weight as a matter of
evidence."93
These exchanges about both physical evidence and witness testimony
also illustrate the direct and oral focus of an American criminal trial, as
opposed to the largely written focus of continental European systems that
rely on a case file composed of evidence gathered by the state's investigator
(a task deemed too important to leave to partisans on each side).
Donovan's closing argument explicitly made the comparison between the
common law adversarial system of justice and the continental European
inquisitorial system, but with the natural bias of an American lawyer for his
own system. Addressing the jury, he explained:
We believe that our trial-by-jury system is the best system ever
devised for arriving at the truth. Why is your function so
important? You might say to yourselves, 'His Honor, the judge,
knows all the law applicable to the case; he has been trained for
many years to evaluate evidence. Why, then, shouldn't cases such
as this simply be left to the lawyers and the judges?' The answer is
that from the time of Aristotle many centuries ago, ordinary citizens
are not content to leave these questions to the lawyers and judges,
with their legalisms and their legal niceties.94
Of course, Donovan himself knew from his experience in Europe that a
great many republics place no such faith in the layman and do indeed prefer
the experience and training of professional finders of fact as well as finders
of law. A recurring theme found in the press reports of Abel's trial, as in
the arguments of the lawyers themselves, was that Abel would receive a
fairer trial in the United States than any captured American spy could
expect to receive in the Soviet Union. The criminal justice system then in
place in the USSR had been strongly influenced by the continental
European inquisitorial system, in which juries played no role and the trial
was essentially a process of evaluating the work of the state's investigator
in compiling the case file that is the hallmark of that system.95
Colonel Abel's case evidenced a deep trust in the jury and the
adversarial contest conducted before them, even in the context of serious
matters of national security. The case is worth recollecting today with the
new fear of terrorism and the urge by some quarters toward a form of
93. Id. at 212. It should be noted that even an overruled objection, when made in the
presence of the jury (as Donovan's objections almost always were), serves notice to the
finders of fact that the evidence is not incontestably admitted for their evaluation.
94. Id. at 224.
95. JEFFREY KAHN, Adversarial Principles and the Case File in Russian Criminal
Procedure, in RUSSIA AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: TEN YEARS AFTER 107-133 (2010).
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96Schmittian exceptionalism for terrorism cases. In the United States, some
call for special courts to try suspected terrorists. Others prefer military
commissions. And some would simply opt not to try such individuals at all
in order to extract intelligence without the limitations placed on government
conduct by the constitutional guarantees that apply to criminal trials and the
statutory and international law that governs military conduct. Military
commissions may well be a reasonable choice in those factual
circumstances when the law of armed conflict is the governing law. All of
these options, including military commissions, are much less defensible for
cases arising out of circumstances that the law of armed conflict cannot
reasonably be seen to govern. What is sought then by advocates of the use
of Article III courts is the control that juries and independent, fact-gathering
defense attorneys take away from the state.
C. Negotiating the Rules in the Guantdnamo Detainee Cases
How such exceptionalism might manifest itself may be gleaned by the
inquisitorial turn apparent in new rules of evidence devised to adjudicate
habeas corpus proceedings for detainees at Guantinamo Bay. These rules
depart from the traditional approach to evidence in the United States.
Evidence - whether in the form of statements or physical evidence - is only
admissible in an American courtroom through the testimony of live
witnesses. 99 That is not the case in classically inquisitorial systems of
96. I refer to the dangerous views of the Nazi legal theoretician, Carl Schmitt. CARL
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5
(George Schwab trans., 1985) (1922) ("Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.").
97. What limits remain by virtue of the Due Process Clause is another matter further
complicated by jurisdictional questions of extraterritoriality and interpretive ones concerning
the Constitution's restrictions on state action.
98. See generally THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY
PERSPECTIVE (2009). Although perhaps too late to rectify the excesses of the past, the
Department of Justice and the Department of Defense have established a protocol for
choosing the forum for prosecuting detainees at Guantinamo Bay that acknowledges this
choice-of-law constraint (statements of David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General, Before
the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, U.S.
Senate, for a hearing titled "Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO
and Beyond," July 28, 2009) ("Decisions about the appropriate forum for prosecution of
Guantanamo detainees will be made on a case-by-case basis in the months ahead, based on
the criteria set forth in the protocol. Among the factors that will be considered are the nature
of the offenses, the identity of the victims, the location in which the offense occurred, and
the context in which the defendant was apprehended."), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=4002& witid=8156.
99. U.S. CONST., amend. VI. As Justice Scalia noted "[t]he common-law tradition is
one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones
examination in private by judicial officers." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43
(2004). In fact, "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. Of course, previously recorded
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justice, in which it could be said, Quod non est in actis, non est in mundo -
"What is not in the file is not in the world."'0" Were Abel's case conducted
in a Soviet courtroom (or, for that matter, a Russian courtroom today),
much of his lawyer's work would be very different. Pre-trial work would
consist primarily in attempts to influence the composition of the case file,
i.e. to influence the development of the prosecution's case. An independent
investigation and search for evidence by the defense would be contrary to
tradition, akin to obstruction of justice in some jurisdictions.
Generally speaking, this approach is not followed in courts in the
United States.' The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution and American rules of evidence and procedure are all premised
on the view that live, oral testimony, subject to cross-examination should be
the foundation of a trial, not a case file.'" However, in the context of
habeas petitions from detainees at Guantinamo Bay, this conventional
understanding has been thrown into doubt.'o (It is important to recognize
that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is decided through a civil action,
to which the Confrontation Clause by its own terms does not apply,
although the underlying detention in question typically arises in the
criminal context or, recently, the context of terrorism cases.) The Supreme
Court indicated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that the exigencies of the overseas
military context could result in relaxed evidentiary standards for some
documentary and physical evidence used to establish the status of detainees.
As the Hamdi plurality put it:
testimony is admissible so long as the defense has had an adequate, prior opportunity to
cross-examine the now unavailable witness.
100. BERNHARD GROSSFELD & JOSEF HOELTZENBEIN, Language, Poetry, and Law:
Order Patents, 10 L. & Bus. REV. OF THE AMER. 669, 670 (2004); see also KAHN, supra note
95, at 107, 109-110.
101. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), finding that
affidavits by forensic specialists about the methodology and results of drug tests were
testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution.
102. It is true that some documentary evidence is deemed by statute to be self-
authenticating. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(10) & 902. Of course, the regular requirements of
relevance and admissibility would still apply, and evidence deemed testimonial in nature
would additionally be subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§8.84 & 8.86 (4th ed.,
2009).
103. An excellent recent summary of these cases is provided by Chisun Lee, Judges
Reject Evidence in Gitmo Cases, NAT'L L.J. 1, 24 (Aug. 16, 2010) (noting that the United
States has lost 37 of 53 habeas cases decided to date). Lee reports that the Obama
administration "has already said that at least 48 of the remaining 176 prisoners at
Guantinamo will be held indefinitely because they're too dangerous to release but can't be
prosecuted successfully in military or civilian court," in part because of "coercion-tainted
evidence." Id.
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[T]he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from
these core elements [of notice and fair opportunity to respond to the
Government's allegations], enemy-combatant proceedings may be
tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for
example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of
the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.'4
Exactly what that meant in practice was left to the district courts to sort
out. Sometimes, the result has sounded more in the inquisitorial tradition of
criminal justice than in the adversarial one. "When the government in these
proceedings asks for a presumption of authenticity on these grounds, it
effectively is asking the judge to reverse the usual practice of requiring the
proponent of potentially-inauthentic evidence to carry the burden of proving
its authenticity."'a Some courts have been persuaded to give such a
presumption to records on which the Government relies to prove up its
detention, notwithstanding chain-of-custody and other problems that
ordinarily are grounds for placing the burden of authentication (with live
witnesses) on the Government. So far, no court has gone so far as to grant
the Government a presumption of accuracy regarding such evidence.'O
And attempts by judges to generate rules concerning the use of hearsay, to
determine burdens assigned and presumptions accorded to each side, to
establish standards of proof, and to resolve many other procedural and
evidentiary issues have little in common save their complexity and
variety."o'
104. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-534 (2004). In Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S.Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008), the Supreme Court also indicated that detainees "may invoke the
fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus." Although these procedural
protections "need not resemble [those] in a criminal trial," merely be "effective" and
"meaningful," the Court did not attempt to define with any precision, the contours of these
terms. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2269.
105. See BENJAMIN WrrrEs, ROBERT CHESNEY, & RABEA BENHALiM, THE EMERGING LAW
OF DETENnON: THE GuANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 33 (2010).
106. Id. at 34.
107. See id. at 35-50. As the authors of this exhaustive and thorough report
demonstrate, the judges themselves initially differed about whether the use of hearsay was
best resolved by a preliminary determination of the admissibility of this evidence or by a
merits-stage assessment of its reliability. In Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879-880
(D.C. Cir. 2010), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
proper approach was a reliability assessment because the concerns of an adversarial criminal
trial are not present ("The habeas judge is not asked, as he would be in a trial, to administrate
a complicated clash of adversarial viewpoints to synthesize a process-dependent form of
Hegelian legal truth."). Nevertheless, these judges have struggled with how to accomplish
this assessment. And, as Wittes, Chesney, and Benhalim note, while admissibility decisions
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Whatever one's view on the necessity of such judicial creativity in this
context, the erosion of the American preference (if not principle) of
adversarial confrontation through live witness testimony is clear. In some
contexts (e.g. the capture of combatants on a traditional battlefield), such a
departure is neither provocative nor ahistorical; in other contexts (e.g.
detention of individuals in circumstances that make their status uncertain),
the issue remains a serious one. It is an open question whether these
evidentiary concessions will leak into the American criminal justice system
if the Government wishes to prosecute suspected terrorists and their agents
with evidence submitted in the form of classified intelligence reports citing
unidentified sources, anonymous foreign experts, and summaries of out-of-
court statements by unavailable witnesses. At least one federal court has
permitted the testimony of an anonymous Israeli intelligence official as an
expert witness (a status with special advantages under the Federal Rules of
Evidence) in a criminal prosecution.'o
On the other hand, other courts have preserved their traditional role and
used traditional rules and well-established procedures to do so. Most
recently, this may be seen in the trial of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who was
charged with hundreds of counts of murder and numerous counts of
conspiracy in supplying the explosives used in the 1998 bombings of the
American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.'" The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Classified Information Procedures Act
governed the disclosure of discoverable materials."o Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan in the Southern District of New York heard and resolved numerous
issues of routine procedure as well as legal issues of profound constitutional
significance. Among these were motions to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that Ghailani's alleged torture at the hands of the CIA violated the
are reviewed de novo, a more deferential standard of review would apply to an appeal of the
fact-finder's assessment of reliability. WITEES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 105, at 39.
108. United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development, No. 3:04-CR-
240-G, 2007 WL 2059722 at 7-8 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2007).
109. See Docket No. 550, Tenth Superseding Indictment, filed Mar. 12, 2001, United
States v. Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-1023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.). Of course, it should be noted that
early in this prosecution the Government made the deliberate decision not to seek the
admission of statements made during Ghailani's period of detention at CIA secret sites
overseas and in the custody of the Department of Defense at Guantinamo Bay. The
Government also chose not to charge a capital offense. Both decisions originated at least
partly out of a desire to avoid the potential disclosure of evidence concerning those detention
sites and conduct that occurred there. BENJAMIN WEISER & CHARLIE SAVAGE, At Terror
Trial, Big Questions Were Avoided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at Al.
110. See, e.g., Docket No. 763, Modified Protective Order Pertaining to Unclassified
Information, filed July 15, 2009, United States v. Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-1023-LAK
(S.D.N.Y.) and Docket No. 765, Modified Protective Order Pertaining to Classified
Information, filed July 21, 2009, United States v. Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-1023-LAK
(S.D.N.Y.).
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Fifth Amendment,"' that his lengthy military detention violated the Speedy
Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment," 2 and that the deprivation of earlier
assigned military counsel denied him his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel."' These motions were all denied in written judicial
opinions ranging from eleven to forty-eight pages of legal analysis. On the
eve of trial, however, Judge Kaplan precluded the testimony of a
government witness whose identity was obtained through the coercive
interrogation of the defendant in secret prisons outside the United States."4
Notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of the crimes for which
Ghailani stood accused, all of these judicial opinions are noteworthy for
being unexceptional, publicly available, minimally redacted, reasoned
dispositions of the arguments before the court. Following a sixteen day
trial, Ghailani was found guilty of one charge of conspiracy to destroy
government property but acquitted of the murder and other conspiracy
charges."' Ghailani faced a minimum twenty-year sentence. On January
25, 2011, Judge Kaplan sentenced Ghailani to life in prison, recommending
that he be held in conditions of highest security, and ordered Ghailani to
make restitution totaling over thirty-three million dollars."6 The restitution,
payable to the victims and their surviving dependants, will almost certainly
never be paid. But there was nothing symbolic in Judge Kaplan's
concluding words after the trial, thanking the jurors and telling them that
their verdict showed that: "American justice can be rendered calmly,
deliberately and fairly by ordinary people, people who are not beholden to
any government, not even ours. It can be rendered with fidelity to the
Constitution. You have a right to be proud of your service in this case."'
111. Docket No. 943, Memorandum Opinion, filed May 10, 2010, United States v.
Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-1023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.).
112. Docket No. 976, Memorandum Opinion, filed July 13, 2010, United States v.
Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-1023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.).
113. Docket No. 828, Memorandum Opinion, filed Nov. 11, 2009, United States v.
Ghailani, No. 1:98-cr-I 023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.).
114. United States v. Ghailani, No. S1098 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 4058043
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010). It should be noted that this opinion was in harmony with Judge
Kaplan's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment as punishment for his
alleged torture. In that previous opinion, Judge Kaplan concluded that dismissal would only
be appropriate if there were "a causal connection" such that the conviction "would be a
product of the government misconduct that violated the Due Process Clause." See supra
note 111, at 5-6. Since the testimony offered appeared to establish such a connection, Judge
Kaplan prohibited its use at trial. This possibility was foreseen in this earlier motion to
dismiss. See supra note t11, at 7.
115. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Jury Acquits Former Detainee of Most Charges, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2010, at Al.
116. Docket No. 1090, Judgment, filed Jan. 25, 2011, United States v. Ghailani, No.
1:98-cr-1023-LAK (S.D.N.Y.).
117. Benjamin Weiser, supra note 115. This assertion must be assessed in the context
of the apparent overlapping legal regimes Ghailani faced. Earlier in the case, Judge Kaplan
observed that Ghailani's status as an enemy combatant could result in his continued
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Many in the United States advocate alternatives to existing criminal
procedures to combat the threat of terrorism. The fear that animates such
arguments was known in Abel's time, too. Less than a fortnight before his
trial began, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik-I."' The federal prosecutor
closed the government's case by describing Abel's offense as "directed at
our very existence and through us at the free world and civilization itself,
particularly in light of the times."" 9 The very same words could be uttered
today. It is worth recalling Justice Jackson's healthy suspicion of
exceptional emergency powers, since emergency powers "tend to kindle
,0120
emergencies.
IV. DONOVAN'S MOTION To EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
The most interesting legal issue in the case, and the one that led to its
argument - twice - before the Supreme Court, was Donovan's motion to
suppress the physical evidence gathered from Abel's room in the Hotel
Latham. Donovan argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution.'2' Donovan's description of his legal theory resonates
today:
A decision on the highest policy level had to be made by the
Department of Justice, with respect to the man in Room 839:
(1) Should the Department, as a law enforcement agency, obtain a
warrant for his arrest on espionage or other criminal charges,
and also a search warrant? If so, the man could be seized and
his room searched but he would have to be publicly brought
before the nearest available U.S. Commissioner or Federal
Judge without unnecessary delay, be entitled to counsel at once,
and then be remanded to a federal prison.
(2) On the other hand, would it be more in the national interest for
the Department, exercising its counter-espionage functions, to
seize the man and his effects in a clandestine manner, conceal
detention "until hostilities between the United States and al Qaeda and the Taliban end, even
if he were found not guilty." Id.
118. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 120.
119. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 238.
120. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Comoany v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650-51 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
121. U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath, or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
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his capture from his co-conspirators as long as possible, and
meanwhile seek to induce him to come over to our side? 22
Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, his own experience in World
War II and as general counsel to the OSS, Donovan was convinced that the
state could lawfully conduct the warrantless arrest of Abel, hoping to turn
him into a double agent for counterintelligence purposes, or it could
prosecute him for the capital crime of espionage. But it could not do both:
We have not criticized their calculated gamble to grab Abel and his
effects, keep his seizure secret as long as possible, and try to
persuade him to aid the United States. We stated in the courts
below that from a counter-espionage, viewpoint, the decision seems
prospectively sound. But we maintain that the Department of
Justice, having elected to gamble that Abel would 'cooperate' and
then having lost, cannot subsequently seek to reverse its steps,
prosecute Abel on evidence inadmissible in federal court, and pay
lip service to due process of law.'
The choice having been made not to comply with constitutional
criminal procedure, the evidence obtained through this detention and failed
attempt to "turn" Abel could not be used in a criminal trial: it was fruit from
a poisonous tree. 2 4 The ostensible basis for the arrest was an administrative
detention order signed by the INS district director, not a warrant issued by a
judge, and the INS agents waited patiently while FBI agents began to
122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 14-15.
123. Id. at 12-13. Superficially, Ahmed Ghailani's case may appear very similar to
Colonel Abel's experience, but on an even grander scale. See Docket No. 976, supra note
112, at 9 (noting that the nearly five years spent in detention "was a deliberate decision to
further intelligence-gathering efforts at the immediate expense of delaying the criminal
prosecution."). Ghailani argued that "[my] arrest in 2004 presented the government with a
choice: it either could have prosecuted him at that time on this indictment or it could have
detained and questioned him in the interests of national security. But it could not do both."
See Docket No. 976, supra note 112, at 17.
Nevertheless, the cases are distinguishable. However hot the Cold War was in 1957,
the two sides were not engaged in an active military conflict. Unlike Abel, Ghailani was
seized abroad by the forces of a foreign power, which transferred him to the custody of the
CIA, which in turn transferred him to the custody of the Department of Defense. See Docket
No. 976, supra note 112, at 3. Finally, leaving to one side the possibility that these actors
violated the relevant body of law that governed Ghailani's detention, these actions do not
evince the pretextual manipulation of law by one executive official acting at the direction of
another. In fact, in sharp contrast to the intentions of Abel's custodians, the Government
stated that "it will not use anything that Ghailani said while in CIA custody, or the fruits of
any such statement, in this prosecution." See Docket No. 943, supra note 111, at 7.
124. The Abel Court would cite Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), for
this proposition, but it would be another three years after upholding Abel's conviction before
the Supreme Court adopted this metaphor. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963).
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question Abel on what they called "a matter involving the internal security
of the United States."' The search of Abel's room was "unreasonable" in
the language of the Fourth Amendment, because it was not a good faith
effort to discover evidence of his alienage, which was all that was permitted
during a legitimate administrative arrest on immigration charges for which
no judicial warrant was required.126 Abel's immigration status was a pretext
to roust him from his bed and search for evidence to confirm the FBI's
suspicion that he was a spy, all the while circumventing the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. According to the defense, the INS
was a willing instrument of the FBI from start to finish. 127
The Government opposed Donovan's motion on the grounds that
Abel's arrest on an INS administrative warrant was perfectly legal and not
governed by the same constitutional rules as an arrest on a criminal warrant.
The arrest being lawful, a search of Abel and his surroundings for weapons
125. Interview by Vin Arthey with Ed Gamber, one of the FBI agent who participated
in the arrest. ARTHEY, supra note 32, at xxxi, 204-205. In retirement, FBI special agent
Gamber, recalled that "[w]e got no co-operation from him whatsoever. He said nothing. He
just sat there and looked at the floor. He didn't say a word." ARTHEY, supra note 32, at 205.
This is mostly confirmed by the testimony of his partner, FBI Special Agent Paul Blasco.
Direct Examination of FBI Special Agent Paul J. Blasco, Hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress, Transcript, supra note 4, at 180-181 (testifying that Abel either sat silently or gave
very terse answers). Whether by instinct or training, Abel's conduct at the time of his arrest
illustrated the constitutional right to remain silent. The FBI gave Abel no such warning on
the morning of his arrest because, according to Agent Blasco's testimony, "we were
conducting an interview to solicit his cooperation." Direct Examination of FBI Special
Agent Paul J. Blasco, Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, Transcript, supra note 4,
at 185-187.
126. An argument based on the subjective "good faith" of the government official
would get little traction today. The Supreme Court made clear in Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis." The Whren Court dismissed arguments to the contrary
that were based partly on dicta from Abel's case, describing the Abel Court's treatment of
pretext as "plainly inconsistent" with later opinions. Whren, 517 U.S. at 816.
It may seem odd to the modern scholar of constitutional criminal procedure that
Donovan did not argue that the search of Abel's room was presumptively invalid because of
its broad sweep. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) ("There is no comparable
justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs - or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized
exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The 'adherence to
judicial processes' mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.") (footnote
omitted). The answer is that Chimel, as its date implies, was not the law in 1957. The law
was stated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which upheld a similar search
based on the officer's expectation of finding evidence of the underlying offense.
Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter wrote a strong dissent to Rabinowitz, which case he
distinguished in his majority opinion in Abel's case. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at
236-37.
127. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 4-6, 21-22.
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or evidence that could have been seized under a criminal warrant was also
permissible.' Likewise, there was nothing improper in the collaboration of
the INS and the FBI. The initial arrest was made in good faith: the FBI
believed that Hayhanen's refusal to testify left it with insufficient evidence
to secure a criminal warrant.29 Apprehension of Abel - believed to be a top
Soviet agent - was therefore only possible on grounds of an immigration
violation.'" When Hayhanen had a change of heart and agreed to testify,
and (thanks to the search of Abel's room) more evidence of espionage
became available, the Government "expeditiously" presented the case to a
Grand Jury, which returned the three-count indictment in the case. 3 ' In
other words, what else was the Justice Department to do, hamstrung by a
recalcitrant witness but charged with responsibility for counter-espionage?
It is interesting to note how the two sides seemed to be arguing past
each other. The Government's arguments were marked by the formality of
their legal reasoning: the arrest was valid because the proper government
channels for accomplishing it had been carefully followed and the seizure
of each item was justified by a different rule or judicial opinion. Abel's
lawyers, on the other hand, focused on the abuse of formalities to
accomplish an ulterior purpose.
As Donovan summarized this divergence between the parties'
reasoning, he asserted that the Government's case rested:
on a false premise which may be mumbled, "an arrest is an arrest is
an arrest." The truth is that what the Government termed "an arrest
sui generis" in its District Court briefs is not an arrest at all, either
civil or criminal. It is a detention process, whereby a person is
taken into custody for the sole and expressed purpose of deportation
from the United States. Yet the Government's basic reasoning, and
the applicability of the case authority cited in its brief, rest upon the
misleading assertion that there was a "valid arrest" in the case at
bar.
128. Brief for the United States, supra note 43, at 29-34. It should be noted that
different justifications were offered for the seizure of different items: the false birth
certificates and other items using an alias that were found in Abel's room were seized as
evidence of the immigration violation; the coded message that Abel tried to hide up his
sleeve was seized as evidence of another crime that Abel had been seeking to conceal on his
person, which itself was subject to search incident to his arrest; and the cipher book,
hollowed-out pencil, and microfilm, the government argued, had been abandoned by Abel
when he threw them away. Id. at 55-60. Although interesting, these lines of argument are
not especially peculiar to Abel's case, and will not be pursued here.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 46-47. See also Transcript, supra note 4, at 58 (Affidavit of Kevin T.
Maroney, Special Attorney, Department of Justice). As suggested, supra text accompanying
note 23, "expeditiously" is a relative term. Abel was held in extrajudicial, secret detention
for almost seven weeks before he was publicly indicted for a crime. See supra note 23.
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Thus, too, the Government weaves back and forth in an elaborate
defense of its process for deportation (the legality of which we have
never disputed) and then leap-frogs to the unwarranted conclusion
that process appropriate for deportation is also appropriate to obtain
evidence of a capital crime - even when the arresting officers
admittedly were convinced that such a capital crime had been
committed but had decided to avoid regular criminal procedures at
that time.'32
These arguments bring to mind the controversy concerning the use of
the immigration laws and material witness warrants to apprehend and
interrogate individuals shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. The arguments of the Government had the same tone: these
detentions were formally lawful, not to mention urgently necessary in the
aftermath of the attack. The arguments of lawyers defending detainees
were similar to Donovan's plea: processes made for one purpose are
unlawfully abused when they are employed for such different objectives.
Donovan's suppression motion was denied, again making headlines.'
First, although admitting the matter was one of first impression, the court
held that no warrant was required for the search of Abel's hotel room
following his detention on an immigration violation, which was not a
criminal offense.134 Second, the court saw no reason why the INS and the
FBI, different branches of the Justice Department, could not work in
tandem, the former seizing Abel on the immigration violation and the latter
investigating his suspected espionage. The court observed, neatly ducking
the issue of procedure in favor of result, "[t]he Department of Justice owes
its first allegiance to the United States, and it is not perceived that an alien
unlawfully in this country has suffered any deprivation of Constitutional
rights" in the factual circumstances of Abel's arrest.135 At the hearing on the
motion, Judge Byers expressed his view that he should not tell the FBI how
to do its job. '36
132. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), No.2,
1959 WL 101554 (internal citation omitted).
133. Abel Loses Move To Bar Evidence, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1957, at 5.
134. United States v. Abel, 155 F.Supp. 8, 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
135. Id. at 11.
136. Transcript, supra note 4, at 131 (Excerpt from district court oral argument on
motion to suppress: "I think it is the job of the F.B.I. to bring to light information concerning
violations of the law and I don't think it is part of the Court's duty to tell them how they
should function.").
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After Abel's conviction, Donovan appealed on precisely this point. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling on
Donovan's pre-trial suppression motion. The Second Circuit considered
deportation to be similar enough to a criminal arrest to extend the general
rule permitting search of the premises where an arrest is made, even a
warrantless one.' The court was willing to allow the INS and FBI to work
in tandem when it suited their purposes, because it saw a clear line dividing
the different agents.' Thus, the good faith of the INS in pursuing its lawful
objective was not tainted by the ulterior motives of the FBI."9 In any event,
the appellate court did not appear interested in parsing this line with a trial
record that "fairly shrieks the guilt" of Colonel Abel of the KGB.'4
Donovan appealed again and the Supreme Court granted his petition for
a writ of certiorari on October 13, 1958.14' The Court limited its grant to
two issues: (1) Was the administrative warrant issued by the INS
constitutionally adequate to search and seize evidence in Abel's rooms after
he was detained for deportation proceedings but not arrested for having
committed a crime; and (2) Was the Constitution violated when such
evidence, unrelated to the immigration interests of the INS, was later used
to convict Abel of espionage? These questions were briefed and argued,
but the Court found itself unable to decide the case. Therefore, the Court
ordered reargument, refining the issue to its technical foundations:
1. Whether under laws and Constitution of the United States (a)
the administrative warrant of the New York Acting District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
validly issued, (b) such administrative warrant constituted a
valid basis for arresting petitioner or taking him into custody,
and (c) such warrant furnished a valid basis for the searches and
seizures affecting his person, luggage, and the room occupied
by him at the Hotel Latham.
2. Whether, independently of such administrative warrant,
petitioner's arrest, and the searches and seizures affecting his
person, luggage, and the room occupied by him at the Hotel
Latham, were valid under the laws and Constitution of the
United States.
137. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 492-94 (2d Cir. 1958).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 494.
140. Id. at 502 (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
141. Abel v. United States, 358 U.S. 813 (1958).
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3. Whether on the record before us the issues involved in
Questions '1(a),' '1(b),' and '2' are properly before the Court.142
Justice Frankfurter put this detailed description of the issue more
plainly in his opinion for the Court: "We are asked to find that the
Government resorted to a subterfuge, that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service warrant here was a pretense and sham, was not what
it purported to be." 43 Unusually, the lawyers were each granted one and
one-half hours for oral argument (instead of the usual 30 minutes),
signaling the difficulty the Court appeared to have with this case.
The opinion this argument produced was a narrow one, with only five
of the nine justices voting to uphold Abel's conviction. Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Clark,
Harlan, Whittaker and Stewart. In principle, Justice Frankfurter found it an
easy matter to note the importance of preventing abuse of the government's
administrative powers as a tool to circumvent constitutional and statutory
safeguards in a federal criminal investigation. 14 Perhaps in order to cobble
together his slim majority, Justice Frankfurter used issue 3 to uphold the
conviction on the narrowest possible grounds: the Supreme Court would not
second guess the lower courts' judgment that the trial record evidenced no
bad faith.'46 Frankfurter noted how Judge Byers had held a pretrial hearing
at which the arguments for suppression of the evidence on these grounds
were fully aired and testimony on the matter heard before issuing a finding
of no evidence of bad faith.147  The Court of Appeals had affirmed this
ruling after its own review. The Court held that the lower courts could
reasonably conclude that the FBI's use of the INS's administrative powers
to enter Abel's room, apply pressure, and extract evidence had all been part
142. Abel v. United States, 359 U.S. 940 (1959).
143. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 225 (1960).
144. Abel v. United States, 359 U.S. 940 (1959).
145. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit speculated in dicta that the Court's disapproval of such a method of law
enforcement may no longer be good law. United States v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612, 614 (8th
Cir. 1997) ("We wonder, in the first place, about the continued validity of Abel in light of
Whren."). In Whren, police used a traffic stop for failing to signal before turning as a pretext
to search the defendants' car for drugs, their true purpose for stopping the vehicle. Since
probable cause existed to believe that defendants had violated a part of the traffic code (a
state of existence that is almost always true for every car on the road if observed long
enough), the Court unanimously held that the subjective intentions of the police "play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
146. Similarly, the issue whether the administrative warrants failed to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement was dismissed by the Court for not having been
preserved on appeal. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230-234 (1960).
147. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960).
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of a "bona fide preliminary step in a deportation proceeding." 48 The formal
distinctions between the decision-making authorities of two components of
the Justice Department had all been carefully preserved, thus making the
practical effect of collaboration acceptable to Justice Frankfurter: "The test
is whether the decision to proceed administratively toward deportation was
influenced by, and was carried out for, a purpose of amassing evidence in
the prosecution for crime." 4 9
Finding the arrest valid, the Court upheld the search made incident to it.
Although subject to no judicial review prior to its use by INS agents, the
administrative warrant did require approval by an independent officer of the
Justice Department. This was protection enough, Justice Frankfurter
concluded, especially considering that warrantless arrests based upon
probable cause of crime were made without any such review at all.5 o The
search being lawful, there was no basis for excluding the evidence found by
it from use at trial. Even the cipher pad and hollowed-out pencil, quickly
thrown away by Abel before being escorted from his hotel room and found
after the FBI returned after Abel had "checked out," were held validly
obtained: what could be unlawful about Government use of abandoned
property?"'
The fact that both the FBI and the INS were components of the same
agency mattered a lot to Justice Frankfurter, who drew a distinction
between their legitimate cooperation and an instance where one agency was
acting "not within its lawful authority but as the cat's paw of another,
unrelated branch of the Government.""' At the time, this line served to
148. Id. at 230.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 236-237.
151. Id. at 240-241.
152. Id. at 230. Justice Frankfurter approvingly cited "the story told in" Colyer v.
Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D.Mass. 1920), rev'd by Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129 (1st Cir.
1922), "[flor a contrast to the proper cooperation between two branches of a single
Department of Justice as revealed in this case". Id. at 229. Why cite a district court case
forty years old, especially only for "the story" told in it, not the holding? The answer has
two parts. First, the case was of particular interest to Justice Frankfurter because it had
benefited from amicus briefs submitted by two trusted lawyers: the young Professor Felix
Frankfurter himself, alongside his colleague at Harvard, Zechariah Chafee. Colyer and
others had been arrested by immigration officials, then under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Labor. Though nominally responsible, these officials had abdicated their
decision-making authority to agents of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (the
precursor to the FBI) to effect the warrantless arrest of aliens affiliated with the Communist
Party. Id. at 30. The court described in vivid detail how "[iun cases of doubt, aliens, already
frightened by the terroristic methods of their arrest and detention, were, in the absence of
counsel, easily led into some kind of admission as to their ownership or knowledge of
communistic or so-called seditious literature." Id. at 47.
But the holding in Colyer did not support Frankfurter's distinction in the Abel case.
Judge Anderson had rejected the petitioner's argument that the Labor Department's
deportation hearings were void because, in essence, controlled by the Department of Justice.
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distinguish cases in which an administrative agency abused its power to
engage in warrantless arrests and searches by collaboration with a separate
agency with a separate mandate. The health inspector, for example, could
not demand entry into a home on grounds of a suspected public nuisance,
only to signal a waiting police officer to the illicit activities found during
his pretextual search.
But perhaps this was a distinction without a difference. Was it so
unimaginable that different components of a single federal agency as large
and powerful as the Department of Justice might be tempted to combine
and magnify their array of separate powers just as two separate agencies
might? Wasn't this all the more likely when agents were under pressure to
protect the country from the threat of anarchists, or Communists, or
terrorists? None other than FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had publicly
boasted after Abel's conviction that the FBI had first concluded that Abel
was a spy and then directed the INS to use its powers to snatch him, a point
Donovan emphasized in one of his Supreme Court briefs.' By testing the
FBI agents for "bad faith," Justice Douglas noted in dissent, the Court had
knocked down a straw man: "The issue is not whether these F.B.I. agents
acted in bad faith. Of course they did not. The question is how far zeal may
be permitted to carry officials bent on law enforcement."'54 Justice Douglas
Id. at 51. Justice Frankfurter now advanced in dicta in the Abel case the holding his side
advanced, but lost, in Colyer's case. (The district court ultimately granted habeas following
a lengthy examination of socialist and communist doctrine, finding as a matter of law that
this manifesto did not advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, a statutory
prerequisite to deportation, and that in many cases the petitioners were denied due process of
law in the conduct of their arrests and deportation hearings. Id. at 58-71. The first part of
this holding was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F. 129, 133
(1st Cir. 1922).) Forty years later, Frankfurter had the last word.
To be completely fair to Justice Frankfurter, Donovan may have goaded him into citing
Colyer v. Skeffington. His opening brief was the only one to cite the case, recalling his work
as an advocate for aliens subject to deportation during the excesses of the Palmer Raids to
the Justice now sitting in a case alleging excesses following the McCarthy era. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 17.
153. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 4, Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217 (1958), No.2,
1959 WL 101555 (citing J. EDGAR HOOVER, MASTERS OF DECEIT, THE STORY OF
COMMUNISM IN AMERICA AND How To FIGHT IT 298-299 (1958)). Donovan used Hoover's
words to support a statement by the Director of the INS that "Abel would not have been
arrested by immigration officials on June 21 if American counter-intelligence had not
requested it," but which the appellate court had dismissed as hearsay. Supp. Brief for
Petitioner, supra at 3.
154. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 245. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, made a
more practical critique of the focus on good faith: "If the search here were of the sort the
Fourth Amendment contemplated, there would be no need for the elaborate, if somewhat
pointless, inquiry the Court makes into the 'good faith' of the arrest. Once it is established
that a simple executive arrest of one as a deportable alien gives the arresting offices the
power to search his premises, what precise state of mind on the part of the officers will make
the arrest a 'subterfuge' for the start of criminal proceedings, and render the search
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mockingly noted the real reason why, though Abel had been kept under
surveillance for a month, no time could be found to obtain a warrant from a
judge or commissioner:
If the F.B.I. agents had gone to a magistrate, any search warrant
issued would by terms of the Fourth Amendment have to
'particularly' describe 'the place to be searched' and the 'things to
be seized.' How much more convenient it is for the police to find a
way around those specific requirements of the Fourth Amendment!
What a hindrance it is to work laboriously through constitutional
procedures! How much easier to go to another official in the same
department! The administrative officer can give a warrant good for
unlimited search. No more showing of probable cause to a
magistrate! No more limitations on what may be searched and
when!...
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted that the failure to secure a warrant
from an independent magistrate before the arrest consequently meant no
obligation to present Abel to an independent magistrate after his arrest, to
publicly "justify what had been done."' 6 There was no one, that is, to ask
why Abel needed to be transported halfway across the country, kept in
solitary confinement, and interrogated daily for weeks without the
assistance of counsel. As Justice Brennan put it, "As far as the world knew,
he had vanished."' 7 Wasn't that reason enough to remain faithful to the
Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained before an
arrest? Justice Frankfurter did not cite to his own opinion for the Court in
McNabb v. United States, in which he expressed a different view of the role
of federal law officers. This reference had to be supplied by Justice
Brennan in his dissent.' Nor did he cite to his opinion for the Court in
Mallory v. United States, issued the year of Abel's arrest, reversing a rape
unreasonable?" Id. at 253.
155. Id. at 246.
156. Id.at251.
157. Id. at 252.
158. Id. at 250. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-344 (1943) ("A
democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards
against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in
itself an assurance of soberness of judgment.... Experience has therefore counseled that
safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic.
The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The
complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility
for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies
for its vindication. ... It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of
persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law
enforcement.") By comparison, Abel was held significantly longer, and without counsel,
than all of the detained members of the McNabb family combined.
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conviction because the police delayed his presentation before a magistrate
until their daylong interrogation had succeeded in eliciting a confession.'59
Beginning in the 1970s, investigations by United States Senate
committees, most notably the one led by Senator Frank Church (the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence
Activities), disclosed how the FBI and the CIA had abused their powers
both separately and in collaboration with each other. At the FBI, the result
was what became known as the "wall" between the Bureau's
counterintelligence and law enforcement functions. An agent involved with
an investigation on one side of this barrier could not communicate with an
agent on the other side. Abel's case could not have proceeded in the same
way under this regime; indeed, it is doubtful whether Abel would ever have
seen the inside of a courtroom. But back in 1960, the Supreme Court had
effectively decided that no "wall" was needed between these two aspects of
the Justice Department's mandate, even though Abel's incommunicado,
secret detention in McAllen could hardly have been said to advance any
immigration purpose.
The danger Douglas perceived was that the list of administrative
officers allowed to conduct warrantless searches would grow to swallow the
rule set by the Fourth Amendment. The countervailing variable he
neglected to include in this equation was the political process. Citizens who
found administrative searches too frequent or intrusive could limit or strip
entirely such powers from government agencies through the political
process. The growth of the American administrative state is a history of
that debate.
Of course, aliens cannot vote. Many have noted the sorry pattern in
American law that begins with restrictions on the rights of foreigners only
to end with the expansion of those restrictions to American citizens.'6 The
Palmer raids, described so vividly in the Colyer case cited by Justice
Frankfurter, resulted in mass warrantless arrests of suspected alien
communists in which it was understood that citizens would occasionally be
swept up in the dragnet, acceptable collateral victims."' Curtailment of the
rights of those accused was deemed necessary "to protect the Government's
interests" during a struggle against a perceived imminent danger.162
159. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957) ("Presumably, whomever
the police arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function of the police to
arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating process at police headquarters in order
to determine whom they should charge before a committing magistrate on 'probable
cause."').
160. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS passim (2003).
161. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17, 37, 40-45 (D. Mass. 1920).
162. Id. at 46.
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The dissenters in the Abel case forecast that the effect of this opinion
would be no different and, indeed, it wasn't. In fact, every generation
perceives imminent dangers and, with unconscious repetition, employs the
same language of justification to commit the same infringements of the
rights of some, usually aliens, in defense of others, usually citizens. But the
exceptional inevitably becomes the status quo. Slowly but surely, the
abuses (as they soon come to be seen once the crisis has passed) are
extended to citizens. The danger lurks, as Justice Brandeis observed, "in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." 6 1
CONCLUSION
Between Abel's case and today, the United States experienced the
dramatic reforms to constitutional criminal procedure introduced by the
Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren. On the
other hand, the temptation to return to old ways remains present. After
September 11th, Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized the use of
material witness warrants and arrest on immigration violations to pursue the
investigation of the attacks. Not a single conviction resulted from the 762
persons seized, detained, and sometimes unlawfully and brutally treated as
a result of these immigration-related arrests.'" Ironically, the INS had more
"success" with Abel's administrative arrest and criminal conviction.
The core evidentiary issue that rose to the Supreme Court, which
Donovan described as one that "would trouble any student of constitutional
law," remains with us today.16 The presidential commission tasked with
the investigation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused
much of its attention on the so-called "wall" separating the FBI's law
enforcement and counterintelligence responsibilities.'" The wall had been
built because of the very sort of misuse of power that Donovan described in
his motion. After 9/11, however, the wall was deemed too high and too
impermeable, and blamed for the intelligence failures that left the United
States vulnerable to attack. Today, experienced and gifted legal minds
argue that the wall should be weakened, if not torn down completely.67 But
163. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
164. EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN BORDER 98 (2008); OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES' ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION
CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/0312/final.pdf.
165. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 117.
166. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST AT7ACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES (2004).
167. STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPING TOMORROW'S
TERRORISM (2010).
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this ends-justifies-the-means thinking was known to Donovan, too, who
concluded his brief with a warning that resonates today:
Abel is an alien charged with the capital offense of Soviet
espionage. It may seem anomalous that our Constitutional
guarantees protect such a man. The unthinking may view
America's conscientious adherence to the principles of a free
society as an altruism so scrupulous that self-destruction must
result. Yet our principles are engraved in the history and the law of
the land. If the free world is not faithful to its own moral code,
there remains no society for which others may hunger."'
Justice Frankfurter's slim majority upheld the conviction by deferring
to the lower courts' evaluations of good faith. This may well be the same
deferential standard of review used to evaluate the reliability determinations
of trial courts assessing hearsay and other exceptional pieces of evidence
submitted by the Government in the habeas cases of detainees held at
Guantlnamo Bay.'"
Lest there be any doubt that the issues we now confront should not
seem new or unfamiliar to us, ask yourself how familiar this summary
description, made by James Donovan about his client's experience more
than fifty years ago, sounds today: "The simple fact was that the Colonel
and all his belongings were made to disappear from the face of the earth
while FBI agents, in a counterintelligence function, carried out their
plan."O And ask whether the prosecutor's closing argument resonates in
your mind as much with the threat of terrorism today as it clearly resonated
for a jury deciding Abel's fate in the shadow of the threat of communism:
Colonel Abel's actions were "directed at our very institutions and through
us at the free world and civilization itself."' 7 1 Our time is well spent
learning from our history.
168. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 66.
169. See supra text accompanying note 107.
170. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 111.
171. Edith Evans Asbury, Abel Jury Hears Final Arguments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1957, at 4.
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